Shortest Path Computation with No Information Leakage by Mouratidis, Kyriakos & Yiu, Man Lung
Shortest Path Computation with No Information Leakage
Kyriakos Mouratidis∗
School of Information Systems
Singapore Management University
kyriakos@smu.edu.sg
Man Lung Yiu†
Department of Computing
Hong Kong Polytechnic University
csmlyiu@comp.polyu.edu.hk
ABSTRACT
Shortest path computation is one of the most common queries in
location-based services (LBSs). Although particularly useful, such
queries raise serious privacy concerns. Exposing to a (potentially
untrusted) LBS the client’s position and her destination may reveal
personal information, such as social habits, health condition, shop-
ping preferences, lifestyle choices, etc. The only existing method
for privacy-preserving shortest path computation follows the obfus-
cation paradigm; it prevents the LBS from inferring the source and
destination of the query with a probability higher than a threshold.
This implies, however, that the LBS still deduces some information
(albeit not exact) about the client’s location and her destination.
In this paper we aim at strong privacy, where the adversary learns
nothing about the shortest path query. We achieve this via estab-
lished private information retrieval techniques, which we treat as
black-box building blocks. Experiments on real, large-scale road
networks assess the practicality of our schemes.
1. INTRODUCTION
The wide availability of positioning systems and the diffusion
of smart-phones has led to an expanding market of location-based
services (LBSs). Clients of these services may use their mobile
devices to get driving directions to their destination, to retrieve fa-
cilities close to their location (e.g., clinics, pharmacies, police sta-
tions), to learn who of their social contacts are nearby, etc.
In this paper we consider shortest path queries in transportation
networks. Such a network could represent the road segments in a
city, where each segment is associated with a cost (e.g., its length
or the time required to drive through it). The query computes the
sequence of road segments to reach from a source s (usually the
client’s current location) to a destination t so that the summed cost
along the path is minimized. This is one of the most common
queries in LBSs. Examples of popular services that support shortest
path computation include Google Maps, Map Quest, etc.
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Practical as these services may be, users view them with increas-
ing skepticism. The very nature of the queries may disclose per-
sonal information (such as health status, shopping habits, lifestyle
choices, etc) which may be tracked and misused by the LBS. Pos-
sible forms of misuse include commercial profiling, governmen-
tal surveillance, unsolicited and intrusive advertising, etc. The re-
cent example of a leading mobile device company, which had been
tracking the locations of its clients without their consent [3, 35],
underlines the serious privacy risks in using LBSs. Note that the
shortest path query in particular, may disclose information not only
about the current position of the client, but also about her intended
destination and path taken. The aforementioned risks motivate the
development of methods to safeguard client privacy.
The only existing approach for private shortest path queries fol-
lows the location obfuscation approach [22]. Instead of the query
source s, this scheme sends to the LBS a set S that includes s and a
number of fake source locations. Similarly, it sends to the LBS a set
of candidate destinations T that includes t and several fake destina-
tions. The LBS computes the shortest path from every location in
S to every location in T . Among the |S| · |T | returned paths (where
|S| and |T | are the cardinalities of the two sets) the client keeps the
one that corresponds to her original source-destination pair. Unfor-
tunately, this approach reveals to the LBS substantial information
about the query; e.g., the source s is known to be among the loca-
tions in S, and t among the |T | candidate destinations.
To avoid such information leakages and provide strong privacy,
a promising direction is to apply private information retrieval
(PIR) [4]. PIR allows a data item (e.g., a disk page) to be retrieved
from a server, without the server obtaining any clues about which
item was retrieved. Unlike obfuscation, PIR offers cryptographic
privacy guarantees, based on reductions to problems that are ei-
ther computationally infeasible or theoretically impossible to solve.
PIR is generally resource-intensive. However, recent PIR protocols
achieve practical response times (in the order of seconds over Giga-
byte databases [36]), and have been successfully applied to private
spatial queries in Euclidean space [28, 19]. As yet, there has been
no PIR-based solution for shortest path computation.
Our objective in this paper is to develop practical schemes for an-
swering shortest path queries without the LBS deducing any infor-
mation about the queries. In other words, the LBS knows only that
a query is being executed, and can infer nothing else. To meet this
requirement, we decide to use existing PIR protocols as building
blocks, and rely on their proven security guarantees. Nevertheless,
the nature of shortest paths imposes many challenges in developing
an efficient PIR-based solution. First, different shortest paths con-
tain different numbers of edges. The result size itself, or the number
of data accesses during processing, may reveal information about
whether the path is short or long. We must ensure that leakages
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of this type are prevented. Second, although current PIR protocols
achieve reasonable retrieval times, they remain much slower than
unsecured disk reads. Therefore, a wise choice of data organization
and indexing strategies is of paramount importance to achieve tol-
erable response times. Third, the PIR building blocks themselves
impose limitations. For instance, the PIR protocol we use [36] may
only support files up to a certain size, calling for special provisions
in solution design. To summarize, our main contributions are:
• We formalize a general methodology that provably achieves to-
tal query privacy;
• We develop specific schemes that implement this general
methodology;
• We enhance them with novel space optimizations;
• We evaluate our solutions on real road networks and assess their
trade-offs.
2. RELATEDWORK
In this section we survey obfuscation and PIR-based methods for
privacy protection in LBSs, along with work on related problems.
2.1 Obfuscation Methods
Spatial k-anonymity is a type of obfuscation for location pri-
vacy that is inspired by the concept of k-anonymity in relational
databases [33]. The architecture includes (i) the clients, (ii) the
LBS that hosts a spatial database and answers queries on it, and
(iii) a trusted mediator, commonly referred to as the Anonymizer.
The clients update the Anonymizer about their most recent loca-
tions, and forward to it their queries. Posed a spatial query, the
Anonymizer replaces the coordinates of the originating client u
with a region (usually a square or a circle) that includes u and at
least k − 1 other clients. This k-anonymous region is forwarded
to the LBS, which reports back to the Anonymizer possible query
answers for any point inside the region. The Anonymizer filters the
results, and forwards to u the actual answer to its query. The pri-
vacy assurance offered to clients is that, even if the LBS knows the
exact locations of all clients, it is unable to identify which among
the k clients inside the anonymous region is the query originator.
There exist several spatial k-anonymity methods for range and
nearest neighbor (NN) queries in Euclidean space [25, 16], as well
as adaptations that drop the Anonymizer from the model, and in-
stead have the clients collaboratively form the k-anonymous re-
gions [5, 12]. There also exist spatial k-anonymity methods for
NN processing on road networks [34, 26]; here, instead of a spatial
region, a set of road segments is used to anonymize u, with the re-
quirement that at least k − 1 other clients are also located on these
segments.
Another class of obfuscation methods use fake locations instead
of k-anonymous regions. In [8, 20], for instance, the client for-
wards to the LBS a set of fake query locations along with her ac-
tual position. The assumption underlying this technique is that the
LBS is unaware of clients’ locations, so that it is unable to tell apart
the decoys. Another approach is to choose a fake location u′ near
the client and forward it as the query point [39, 29]. In this set-
ting, nearest neighbor queries can be answered by incrementally
fetching from the LBS the NNs of u′ and stopping when the set of
retrieved data objects is guaranteed to contain the NNs of the actual
client’s location.
The only method to protect shortest path queries in road net-
works follows the obfuscation paradigm [22]. This scheme as-
sumes the existence of an Obfuscator, which plays a role similar
to an Anonymizer, i.e., it serves as a trusted mediator between the
clients and the LBS. A client u querying about the shortest path
from a source s to a destination t, relays its request to the Ob-
fuscator. The Obfuscator appends s and t with a number of de-
coys, producing obfuscation sets S and T , which it then forwards
to the LBS. The latter computes all shortest paths from any candi-
date source in S to any candidate destination in T . Upon receipt
of these paths, the Obfuscator picks the one that corresponds to the
real source and destination, and reports it to the client. To improve
performance, [22] suggests that the fake sources and destinations
are chosen close to the real s and t.
By definition, obfuscation methods disclose some information
about the query location, thus providing weak privacy. For in-
stance, spatial k-anonymity methods reveal to the LBS that the user
lies inside the k-anonymous region, which is only a part of the en-
tire data space (and usually a small one). Similarly, in methods that
append u with decoys, the LBS is offered a finite set of alternatives
for u to be located at. If the LBS can additionally disqualify some
decoys (e.g., via contextual knowledge), its chances of guessing
correctly the client’s location increase. On the other hand, in [39,
29] the LBS does not acquire the actual client location, but it still
gains information about her whereabouts, because u′ lies in her
vicinity. For the specific case of shortest path privacy in [22], the
LBS obtains knowledge of a finite set of alternatives for s and t
(|S| and |T | candidate locations, respectively) which, moreover, lie
near the actual source and destination, providing a rough idea of
their positions. Also, this method discloses strong clues about the
length and composition of the shortest path itself, since the |S| · |T |
paths returned have similar lengths and possibly share many edges
too. Our objective in this paper is to prevent leakage of any clues
about the query, including any knowledge about s, t, or the path.
Although not an obfuscation method per se, another approach
considered for location privacy is space transformation [18, 37, 38].
In this model, the database owner, who is different from the LBS,
maps the data from the original Euclidean space into a transformed
space using a keyed function. A querying client u (in possession of
the secret key) converts her location into the transformed space and
forwards it to the LBS. The latter, although unaware of the secret
key and thus unable to map the data and query back to the original
space, is still able to compute the query result. [18] supports ap-
proximate NN processing, [37] provides exact NN results, and [38]
additionally answers range queries. All methods in this category
are tailored to spatial queries in the Euclidean space, and are inap-
plicable to road networks (or graph data in general). Transforma-
tion techniques are meant for single client settings, because posses-
sion of the secret key by multiple ones implies that any client may
collude with the LBS to “decrypt” another’s query. Also, trans-
formation schemes are susceptible to access pattern attacks [36].
For example, the LBS may observe the access frequencies of items
in the transformed space and use them in tandem with contextual
knowledge about the original space to deduce a (partial) mapping
between the two spaces.
2.2 PIR-based Methods
Private information retrieval (PIR) is a primitive for retrieving
data hosted by a server, without the server learning anything about
the clients’ access patterns [4]. The privacy guarantees of PIR pro-
tocols rely on reductions to problems that are either computation-
ally infeasible or theoretically impossible to solve1. In this work
we use PIR schemes as building blocks in order to exploit these
strong guarantees.
Many types of single-server PIR are known to incur prohibitive
computation and/or communication overheads for sizable datasets
1For a complete survey of PIR techniques and an in-depth descrip-
tion of their inner workings, the interested reader is referred to [10].
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[32]. However, recent hardware-aided PIR protocols are shown
to be both secure and practical. These protocols utilize a tamper-
resistant, secure co-processor (SCP) that is installed at the server
and is trusted by the clients. For example, [36] features constant
communication and amortized polylogarithmic computation cost.
PIR schemes have been applied in the context of spatial queries.
The first such method appeared in [11] for NN processing, but re-
lied on a particularly expensive PIR protocol. More recent pro-
posals utilize hardware-aided PIR and report reasonable computa-
tion/communication overheads for NN retrieval (a few seconds for
Gigabyte databases) [19, 28]. Importantly, [28] asserts that it is not
enough to retrieve disk pages from the LBS via a PIR protocol, but
the number of pages accessed should be the same for all queries.
Otherwise, clues may be given about the data of interest and there-
fore about the query itself. So far there has been no PIR-based
method for shortest path queries.
2.3 Relevant Privacy Issues on Graph Data
In this paper we aim at preventing the LBS from deducing clues
about the shortest path queries it is called to answer. There exist
several streams of work on different (yet related) privacy issues in
processing road network data.
One of them focuses on protecting graph data when outsourced
to third-party servers or on the cloud (see [9] and references
thereof). The main idea in these proposals is to modify the graph
so that its exact information is concealed from the hosting server
but some of its key topological characteristics are preserved. While
this class of methods aims to protect the graph data from the pro-
cessing server, our objective is to protect the clients’ queries; in our
model, the road network data are known to the LBS, which may be
their owner in the first place.
Another body of related work deals with verifying the accuracy
and correctness of the results returned by the processing server
[27, 23]. Database authentication schemes have been proposed for
shortest path verification in road networks [40]. These approaches
are orthogonal to our problem – in our setting the LBS is curi-
ous, but not malicious, i.e., it is interested in learning the clients’
queries, but would not falsify nor tamper with their results.
Targeting LBS clients that move in road networks, there have
also been methods for identity protection (as opposed to location
privacy), such as mix-zone techniques [1]. Assuming that the
clients need continuous access to an LBS as they walk or drive
through a road network, they wish to hide their identity. For this
purpose they use pseudonyms to communicate with the LBS. To
prevent the linking of pseudonyms with the underlying client iden-
tities (through observation of long-term client movements), the
pseudonyms change whenever clients enter a mix-zone. Mix-zones
are usually placed at road junctions.
Graph problems have also been considered in the semi-trusted
model, where multiple parties hold different pieces of information
and collaboratively answer a query without disclosing their part
of the data to each other. For example, [2] proposes a protocol
that allows two entities, which hold different parts of a graph, to
compute the all-pair shortest distances in the combined (i.e., com-
plete) graph. In [6] an entity needs to compute a shortest path
from a source to a destination without crossing a polygonal ob-
stacle known only to another entity.
3. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we frame the problem, define our privacy objec-
tive and outline a provably secure methodology. We then present
characteristics of SCP technology and of the employed PIR proto-
col that guide our solution design.
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Figure 1: System architecture
3.1 Problem Formulation and System Model
Query: A road network is modeled as a weighted graph G =
(V,E), where V is the set of nodes, and E the set of edges. The
nodes v ∈ V represent junctions, or positions on a road where
the traffic conditions or the orientation change, such as road turns.
Every edge e ∈ E connects two nodes and is associated with a pos-
itive weight w(e) that models the cost to traverse e, e.g., the trav-
eling time from one node to the other, the length of e, etc. A path
from a source node s ∈ V to a destination node t ∈ V is a sequence
of edges starting at s and leading to t. The cost of a path is defined
as the sum of costs across its edges. The path from s to t with the
smallest cost is called the shortest path and is denoted as SP (s, t).
We consider that E includes directed edges and that s, t lie on two
network nodes; the discussion easily extends to undirected edges
and our contributions apply to query sources/destinations that lie
anywhere on the road network (e.g., in between the endpoints of an
edge). We assume that all nodes have Euclidean coordinates.
Architecture: The road network G is hosted by an LBS – G may
be owned by the LBS itself or another entity. The LBS stores on
the disk the graph data and any indexing information thereof, orga-
nized in equal-sized blocks (pages). The clients of the LBS pose
shortest path queries on G, and the LBS needs to report the results
back to them. A secure co-processor (SCP) is installed at the LBS,
and offers a PIR interface for clients to retrieve disk pages from the
database of the LBS. Details about the SCP and the PIR protocol
employed are given in Section 3.2. Although we assume that the
database resides on disk, the PIR interface (and our entire frame-
work) applies to storage in main memory or a solid state drive.
The architecture is visualized in Figure 1. When a client wishes
to pose a query, she establishes an encrypted connection (e.g., SSL)
with the SCP and answers the query via a multi-round protocol. In
each round, the client requests specific disk pages from the SCP,
which retrieves them from the database (one by one) in a way obliv-
ious to the LBS. The data fetched determine the page requests in the
next round, and so on, until the shortest path is computed.
Adversary: The adversary in our model is the LBS. We assume
that it knows the client’s identity (e.g., via user log-in) or may infer
it2. The adversary is curious, but not malicious [36], i.e., it wishes
to gain information about the clients’ queries, yet it executes page
access routines correctly, and would not falsify the data in any way.
The road network information and its index (if any) are not en-
crypted, i.e., their plaintext is available to the LBS, who may well
be their owner. The adversary is also aware of the processing pro-
tocol in use. Its computational power is polynomially bounded (a
common assumption that enables the use of cryptographic primi-
tives, such as secure hash functions, etc).
Security Objective and Privacy Guarantee: Our objective is to
develop practical protocols for processing shortest path queries at
2Even without user log-in (such as in Google Maps), identification
is possible via background knowledge (e.g., user profile/search his-
tory), especially if information about the client’s source and desti-
nation also leaks.
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the LBS without the latter deducing any information about the
queries. The database comprises a set of files, e.g., a header file,
a graph data file, an index file, etc. Similar to [28], we assert that
every shortest path query follows the same query plan – this is nec-
essary in order to achieve our privacy goal, as we make clear in
the security proof below. Specifically, we ensure that every query
(i) executes in the same number of rounds, (ii) in each round it
accesses the same files in the same order, and (iii) from each file
accessed in a specific round, it retrieves the same number of pages.
The query plan is determined by the processing protocol (we will
see how) and is publicly available. For example, if the protocol sug-
gests that in the second round 5 pages are fetched from file F1 and
then 10 from file F2, every query in its second round must fetch 5
pages from F1 followed by 10 from F2 (in this order). This implies
that even though a certain query may need fewer than the specified
pages from a file, the protocol pads its requests with dummy page
retrievals in order to conform to the query plan. The following the-
orem proves that our methodology achieves the security objective.
THEOREM 1. Our methodology leaks no information to the ad-
versary about the shortest path query. Equivalently, every pro-
cessed query is indistinguishable from any other.
PROOF. Each page requested from a file is retrieved via an es-
tablished PIR protocol. Therefore, the adversary is oblivious of
which page of the file is being read. What is only visible to the LBS
is that a page is being accessed in the specific file. Since all queries
follow the same query plan, the number of page retrievals in the var-
ious files and their chronological order is identical for all queries,
lending the adversary no means to tell any two of them apart. For
this reason too, even if the exact same query is re-executed, the
LBS is unable to detect that it is processing the same query. Hav-
ing established that the adversary gains no information from query
execution, the proof is completed by the fact that it is also unable
to intercept the client’s page requests (to the SCP) and the page
contents sent back from the SCP (to the client), because they are
transmitted via a secure connection (SSL).
The general methodology described above fulfills our privacy
objective. However, the challenge now lies in determining spe-
cific processing schemes which (i) ensure that all queries follow
the same query plan, and (ii) are practical in terms of performance
(e.g., in terms of query response time, space overhead, etc). Be-
fore presenting any schemes, we provide some background about
hardware-aided PIR that determines our design principles.
3.2 Background and Design Considerations
We require a PIR interface that allows clients to securely access
the database of the LBS – as explained in Section 2.2, hardware-
aided PIR is currently the only practical option. To provide a read-
ily deployable framework, we rely on existing SCP technology and
PIR protocols. Hence, we review their properties and limitations.
The SCP is trusted by the clients and installed at the process-
ing server. It has access to the server’s disk and may execute a set
of cryptographic primitives. SCPs support complete tamper detec-
tion, so that clients may remotely assess whether they operate un-
molested and unobserved by any potential adversary. The tamper-
resistance of SCPs comes at the cost of excessive heat dissipation
which, in turn, limits their computation speed and memory capac-
ity. General purpose SCPs are available in the market, such as the
IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor.
To fetch disk pages obliviously from the database of the LBS, we
employ the protocol of [36] due to its superior performance (note
however that alternative PIR protocols could be used). Retrieving a
disk page has an amortized computation cost of O(log2N), where
N is the total number of pages in the accessed file. The amortized
complexity is used because some retrievals may involve reorgani-
zation in parts of the file. In absolute terms, a real implementation
on IBM 4764 takes around one second to retrieve a page from a Gi-
gabyte file. The communication cost incurred is constant, i.e., the
amount of data transferred to the client (via the SSL connection)
have the same size as the original disk page read.
The computation cost of the protocol, albeit much smaller than
other PIR approaches, is still several times larger than a plain (un-
secured) disk read. To ensure the viability of our schemes, a key
objective in our design is to keep the number of pages fetched per
query (i.e., per shortest path computation) as small as possible.
This will also limit the communication cost.
Importantly, the protocol of [36] requires that the SCP has at
least c · √N memory, where c is a parameter with a typical value
of 10. In conjunction with the limited memory on the SCP, this
implies that files larger than a certain size cannot be supported –
in our experiments, the SCP (IBM 4764) has 32 MByte RAM and
may support files up to 2.5 GByte. It is also indicative that the
memory capacity in SCP technology increases much slower than,
say, hard disk capacity. Therefore, in our solution design it is es-
sential to keep the database size small.
A final remark regards our choice to adopt a multi-round method-
ology, i.e., to have the client lead query processing with repetitive
page requests. One could wonder why the processing logic is not
completely shipped to the SCP, so that it runs locally the necessary
rounds of the protocol, and directly reports to the client the query
result (shortest path). The reason is that programming on the SCP
is particularly cumbersome, and also that complicated code may
lead to prolonged execution due to the aforementioned overheating
issues. In our design, we use the SCP merely as an interface to se-
curely fetch specific disk pages (one at a time), using off-the-shelf
functionality in order to ensure direct applicability.
4. BASELINE SOLUTIONS
There exist several approaches to process shortest path queries
in the literature, but they are unsuitable to our model. The straight-
forward way to answer the query is to invoke a disk-based version
of Dijkstra’s algorithm [7], A* search [14], etc. Data organization
aside, performance in our setting would be prohibitive. As elabo-
rated previously, all queries in a secure scheme must perform the
same number of page retrievals. This implies that every query will
incur the same processing cost as the costliest possible shortest path
computation. It is a known fact that for certain source-destination
pairs (e.g., the anti-diagonal nodes in G), these algorithms access
almost the entire road network. This would bound every query to
incur a cost equivalent to accessing all pages in the database.
There are indexing methods where search runs first on a hyper-
graph in order to guide processing in the underlying network G,
such as HiTi [15]. These approaches rely on the same expansion
principles as Dijkstra’s algorithm in the voluminous (due to heavy
materialization) hyper-graph, and run into similar problems.
Several pre-computation methods also exist, such as Landmark
[13], Arc-flag [21], SPQ [31], etc. The idea is to materialize
some information together with each node or edge, so that when
the node/edge is reached by network expansion, it helps narrow
down the possible hops to adjacent nodes. Adapting these meth-
ods to our setting reduces in part the deficiencies of plain network
search. However, performance remains problematic because dis-
tant source-destination pairs still require reading a large portion of
the database (thus bounding any query to an equally high process-
ing cost). For the sake of comparison with our advanced schemes,
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we present the two best-performing adaptations we constructed
from this category, based on Landmark and Arc-flag.
Adaptation of Landmark (LM): Landmark [13] chooses a num-
ber of anchor nodes in G and pre-computes for each v ∈ V the
shortest path costs (from v) to the anchors. The vector of costs,
called Landmark vector, is kept with v and helps compute estimates
for the cost of SP (v, t) to the destination t. This information is uti-
lized by A* search which visits first nodes with a small estimated
cost to t. We adapt Landmark to our setting and use it as a baseline
in our experiments; we refer to this scheme as LM.
To enhance performance, we exploit locality. In particular, we
first partition G into regions. For each region we allocate one disk
page and inside store the information (i.e., the adjacency lists and
Landmark vectors) of all its nodes. The resulting file is denoted as
Fd. It is essential that the partitioning method does not waste space,
i.e., it leaves in every disk page as little empty space as possible,
in order to keep the database small. To produce regions that fulfill
this requirement we use a method described in Section 5.6.
In the first round of processing, the querying client requests for
and receives a header file, denoted as Fh. This file includes the par-
titioning information, i.e., it allows mapping any point that lies on
the network to the region that contains it. Additionally, for each re-
gion it indicates the page number in Fd that holds its data. Finally,
it also specifies the query plan (the plan’s derivation is described
after the algorithm outline). The header is small and must be ac-
cessed by any querying client. It is therefore retrieved from the
LBS in its entirety, without using the PIR interface.
Having received the header, the client locally maps its source
and destination into the containing regions Rs and Rt, termed the
source and the destination region, respectively. In round two, she
fetches from Fd the pages that hold the data of these two regions
(via the SCP and the secure connection, so that the LBS is oblivi-
ous of which regions these are). She initializes an A* search at s
using the Rs data. When the search encounters a node that belongs
to another region, a new round of processing is initiated and the
corresponding Fd page is fetched via the PIR interface, and so on,
until the destination t is reached. Note that all queries must abide
by the query plan, which means that upon reaching t, the client may
need to make dummy requests until the necessary number of page
retrievals is reached.
To determine the query plan, we execute the algorithm (without
dummy requests) from all possible sources s ∈ V to all possible
destinations t ∈ V , and record the maximum number of pages
needed from Fd. Observe that in LM the query plan is simply de-
fined by the number of pages retrieved, because every round fetches
exactly one page from Fd, with the exception of the first round,
which fetches two (for Rs and Rt).
Adaptation of Arc-flag (AF): Arc-flag [21] requires partitioning
the road network into regions. For each edge e ∈ E, it keeps a bit-
vector where every bit corresponds to a region – the bit for a region
is set to 1 only if there is a shortest path from one endpoint of e to
a node in that region that passes through e. With this information,
processing a shortest path query only considers edges whose bit for
the destination region is 1. We construct a second baseline, termed
AF, that relies on Arc-flag.
The adaptation is similar to LM. A major difference, however, is
that we drop the requirement that the data of a region (adjacency
lists of nodes and bit-vectors of edges) must fit in a disk page. For
large networks this would lead to numerous regions, and thus huge
bit-vectors. Instead, we allocate for each region a fixed number
of pages, to be retrieved together during query processing. The
number of pages per region is a parameter of the method.
To conclude the discussion about pre-computation techniques,
we stress that full materialization is also inadequate for our setting.
This approach would compute and materialize the shortest paths
for every possible source-destination pair, so that the result for any
query could be looked up directly. The problem is that, even for
small road networks, the space needed to store all paths is orders
of magnitude larger than the maximum supported by the PIR inter-
face. For the smallest network in our evaluation (Oldenburgh, with
around 6K nodes), this approach requires approximately 20 GByte,
which increases cubicly with the network size.
The spatial network literature includes methods for shortest path
computation on the air [17], i.e., where the road network data are
periodically broadcast, and the clients tune in the channel to process
their queries locally. Their objective is to construct a broadcast cy-
cle and inside distribute indexing information in order to minimize
(i) the time that the client keeps its receiver on and (ii) the distance
(in the broadcast cycle) between the first and the last data packet
needed for query processing. These methods are inapplicable to
our case due to the different nature of the problem (e.g., on the air
there is no random access because the clients cannot control the
broadcast schedule – once missed, a packet can only be received in
the next broadcast cycle). However, the technique in [17] includes
the idea of partitioning the network and broadcasting, for every pair
of source-destination regions, the intermediate regions that may ap-
pear in a path between them. The pre-computation in Section 5.2
employs a similar idea.
5. CONCISE INDEX SCHEME
The main performance factors in our design, as established in
Section 3.2, are query processing cost and database size. The for-
mer is linked directly to the maximum number of pages needed for
any possible source-destination pair (due to the fixed query plan
requirement). The latter, i.e., database size, indirectly affects the
retrieval cost (recall that the time to fetch a page via the SCP in-
creases polylogarithmically with the number of pages in the file),
but the primary reason to keep it small is because the PIR interface
may support files up to a certain size only.
Our first scheme is termed Concise Index (CI). It features a mini-
mal space overhead and a manageable query processing cost. In CI
the database consists of four files, namely the header, the look-up,
the network index and the region data file; we denote them as Fh,
Fl, Fi, Fd, respectively. Their roles are as follows.
• Header: CI partitions the network into regions. The header
helps the client map her source and destination to their host re-
gions. It also includes the query plan.
• Look-up: It enables browsing the network index file.
• Network index: It includes pre-computed information that helps
guide the shortest path search.
• Region data: It stores the actual network information of each
region, i.e., node coordinates, adjacency lists, etc.
We first present the pre-processing steps in CI, i.e., network par-
titioning and pre-computation (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). Next, we
describe the exact contents of each file (Section 5.3). Then, we
discuss the derivation of the query plan and the query processing
algorithm (Section 5.4). Finally, we propose space optimization
techniques (Sections 5.5 and 5.6).
5.1 Network Partitioning
CI, as well as subsequent schemes, relies on a partitioning of the
road network into regions. The choice of partitioning method is
important. One requirement is that it must be easily representable
696





 

	

Figure 2: KD-tree partitioning and border nodes
in terms of Euclidean coordinates. The reason is that clients are
unaware of node or region identifiers3, and may only express their
source and destination in terms of Euclidean coordinates. Another
requirement is that space is not wasted. Since regions are to be
placed on disk and it is essential to keep the database small, we need
to leave as little unutilized space in each page as possible. Impor-
tantly, the partitioning should facilitate query processing, implying
that regions should be chosen such that shortest paths are likely to
cross as few of them as possible. Last but not least, the partitioning
information should be expressible in a concise form, because it will
be sent to the clients (as part of Fh) over a communication network.
A simple partitioning method is to superimpose a KD-tree (in
Euclidean space) on the road network. This technique produces
regions of comparable quality (in terms of facilitating shortest path
computation) to more sophisticated and complex alternatives [24].
Additionally, the tree structure (which essentially determines the
mapping between Euclidean coordinates and network regions) can
be represented in a very concise form.
Each leaf of the tree holds the nodes that lie inside its spatial ex-
tent; a node’s information includes its identifier, its coordinates and
its adjacency list (i.e., the list of adjacent nodes and the weights of
the corresponding edges). Every leaf determines a region and is as-
sociated with a region identifierRi. Figure 2 illustrates the KD-tree
partitioning of a sample road network. The bold lines correspond
to the split lines of the tree nodes. Region R1 is defined by the leaf
shown shaded, and holds the information of all nodes inside. The
tree structure can be represented simply by the splitting coordinate
(either on the x or y axis) used in every node of the tree, e.g., the
first split is at x = 4, followed by splits at y = 5 and y = 6 in the
left and right child of the root, and so on.
KD-tree partitioning fulfills all requirements we set, except for
high disk page utilization. The idea in CI is that node information
for each region is placed in a single disk page4. That can be en-
forced by splitting the tree nodes until the network information in
every leaf fits in a page. The problem, however, is that this may
leave up to 50% of the page empty, leading to an unnecessarily
large database. We developed a KD-tree construction method that
minimizes unutilized space and effectively reduces the database
size. We leave the details of this technique for Section 5.6.
3Node and region identifiers are a matter of naming during database
creation, and cannot be assumed known to the client in advance.
4Note that placing region information contiguously on the disk
(i.e., ignoring physical page boundaries) leads to regions that may
cross over to a second page. We wish to avoid this for performance
reasons that will become clear shortly.
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Figure 3: Shortest paths between border nodes
5.2 Pre-computation
CI pre-computes and materializes some shortest path informa-
tion. Key in this process is the notion of border nodes. These
are intersection points of the network edges with the splitting lines
of the KD-tree. In Figure 2, for example, region R1 has 6 bor-
der nodes, represented as solid squares. Border nodes are treated
as normal network nodes during pre-processing, but they are dis-
carded afterwards (i.e., not stored in any file).
The fundamental property of border nodes is that any path start-
ing from a source s inside some region Rs to a destination outside
of it must pass through one of the border nodes of Rs. Similarly,
any path to a destination t in region Rt (from a source outside of
it) passes through a border node of Rt. Consider a shortest path
SP (s, t) and let v and v′ be the border nodes of the source and
destination region, respectively, that appear in this path. Due to
its cost minimality, SP (s, t) is guaranteed to include SP (v, v′).
The above facts combined suggest that SP (s, t) passes necessarily
via SP (v, v′) for some border node pair (v, v′). In Figure 3, as-
sume that s is somewhere in R1 and t in R8. If the shortest path
SP (s, t) passes through border node v1, it necessarily includes ei-
ther SP (v1, v2) (shown red) or SP (v1, v3) (shown blue), where
v2 and v3 are the border nodes of R8.
Based on this observation, CI computes for every pair of regions
Ri, Rj the shortest paths from all border nodes in Ri to all border
nodes in Rj . Let Si,j be the set of intermediate regions crossed by
at least one of these paths. For example, the consideration of bor-
der node pair (v1, v2) in Figure 3 would include (the identifiers of)
R3, R4, R7 into region set S1,8. By definition, any shortest path
from a source in Ri to a destination in Rj may pass only through
Ri, Rj and regions in Si,j . This pre-computation process is also
necessary for Si,j sets where i = j (i.e., when source and destina-
tion regions are the same) because a shortest path between border
nodes of Ri might still pass through a neighboring region.
5.3 File Formation
After partitioning and pre-computation, the CI files are formed.
Region Data File (Fd): As mentioned previously, Fd includes ex-
actly one page for every region Ri. Inside it keeps the network
information of Ri, including node identifiers, their adjacency lists
and incident edge weights.
Network Index File (Fi): Fi contains the pre-computed Si,j in-
formation. The region sets Si,j are stored into pages in ascending
order of composite key (i, j). They are placed contiguously into
pages, with the objective of minimizing the total number of pages
each of them spans. In particular, for Si,j sets with size smaller
than a page (as in the vast majority of cases), we prevent them from
stretching over two pages. This implies that during file formation,
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Figure 4: Fl and Fi example
if the free space in a page is not enough to host the next Si,j set (in
(i, j) order), the space is left unutilized and the region set is placed
in the next page of the file. This is important in order to reduce
the PIR retrieval cost per region set. The same reasoning applies
to (the rare case of) region sets larger than a page; an Si,j set with
size, say, 2.2 times the page capacity, is not allowed to stretch over
four pages – if necessary, its data start in a new page in order to
span three pages in total.
Figure 4 (in its lower part) illustrates an example of Fi. The
striped space at the end of the pages is unutilized. The figure
demonstrates the general case, where edges are directed. In case
of an undirected graph, sets Si,j and Sj,i would be identical, and
hence region sets Si,j where i > j would be omitted from the
network index file.
Look-up File (Fl): Fl is essentially a dense index over Fi, as
shown in Figure 4. Specifically, for every (i, j) pair, Fl stores a
look-up entry that indicates the page number in Fi that holds re-
gion set Si,j . The Fl entries are sorted on composite key (i, j).
The pages in Fl are packed, i.e., each stores the maximum possible
number of look-up entries. This implies that for any pair (i, j), a
division by that number indicates the Fl page that holds the corre-
sponding look-up entry (which in turn leads to the actual Si,j data
in Fi). Note that Fl is much smaller than Fi because a look-up en-
try takes up less space than the average Si,j set. Also, its size can
be reduced by omitting the (i, j) values because they are implicitly
defined by their order in Fl.
Header File (Fh): The header includes the KD-tree information
that allows mapping s and t to their host regions. For each leaf
of the KD-tree (i.e., for each region) the header also stores (i) a
region identifier (e.g., R1, R2, etc), and (ii) the page number in Fd
that holds the actual network information of the region. The header
additionally specifies the query plan and meta-data about the other
three files (e.g., filename, size, record length for Fl, etc). Fh is
small and needs to be downloaded by every client who wishes to
pose a query. Therefore, it discloses no information about the query
itself, and is downloaded in full directly from the LBS, without
involving the PIR interface.
5.4 Query Processing
Consider a client who wishes to know the shortest path from
source s to destination t, and ignore the query plan for the time. In
the first round of processing, the client receives the header file Fh.
Based on the coordinates of s and t, she uses the KD-tree informa-
tion to determine the source and destination regions Rs, Rt. Note
that there is no requirement that s and t are network nodes; they
could lie anywhere on the road network.
In the second round, the client uses the PIR interface and fetches
the page in the look-up file Fl that corresponds to pair (s, t). She
extracts the look-up entry for the specific pair and learns the page
number in the network index file Fi that stores the Ss,t set. In the
third round, she fetches that page from Fi (via the SCP); if Ss,t
stretches to nearby pages, they are also retrieved (this incorporates
an implementation detail elaborated shortly).
In the fourth round, the client requests (via the SCP) the pages of
Fd that include the network information of Rs, Rt, and all regions
in Ss,t. Upon receipt of these data, she possesses a subgraph of G
that is guaranteed to contain the desired shortest path. SP (s, t) is
computed using Dijkstra’s algorithm in this subgraph.
Query Plan: In addition to the above accesses, the query plan may
require extra (dummy) page retrievals. In the first round the en-
tire Fh is downloaded. In round two, there is always a single page
fetched from Fl. In round three, we force each query to retrieve
as many pages from Fi as the maximum number of pages spanned
by any Si,j set. This means that even if a single Si,j set spreads
over three pages in the file (while every other fits in one or two),
any query will need to make three retrievals in Fi. An important
implementation detail here is that the client does not know in ad-
vance how many pages Ss,t spans, but she knows from the query
plan that the maximum it could be is three. Therefore, it requests
for the page indicated by the look-up entry for pair (s, t) plus the
subsequent two pages5.
Regarding round four, letm be the maximum number of regions
inside any Si,j set. Recall that each region’s data fit in a single page
of Fd. The query plan ensures that every query accesses m + 2
pages in Fd (the extra two pages account for Rs and Rt).
5.5 Index Compression
In this section we describe a technique to bring down the space
overhead of CI (and, indirectly, the PIR retrieval cost too). Specifi-
cally, we reduce the size of the network index file. The crucial ob-
servation is that the Si,j sets for nearby (i, j) pairs have significant
overlaps due to locality. This motivates an in-page compression
mechanism, which takes place as Fi is being formed.
When storing an Si,j set into a disk page, we check which of
the region sets already in this page has the largest overlap (i.e., the
largest number of common elements) with Si,j . Let this set be
Sk,l. We use Sk,l as reference for Si,j and only store its delta in-
formation, determined as follows. Let n be the number of elements
(region identifiers) that appear in Si,j but not in Sk,l. These region
identifiers must be definitely indicated in the delta information to
ensure correctness of shortest path computation.
If the number of elements in Sk,l plus n is no larger than value
m (introduced in Section 5.4), the delta includes just these n region
identifiers. Expressing the Si,j information this way, implicitly in-
flates its contents (by those region identifiers that belong to Sk,l
but not to Si,j). This, however, incurs no response slow-down, be-
cause anyway a shortest path query fromRi toRj needs to perform
a number of dummy requests in the region data file in order to reach
m+ 2 in total (so as to adhere to the query plan) – essentially, our
compression strategy replaces some of the dummy requests with
fetching unneeded region data.
On the other hand, if the number of elements in Sk,l plus n ex-
ceeds m, the delta information of Si,j must additionally specify
region identifiers not to be fetched. These identifiers should be-
long to Sk,l but not to Si,j . We need to indicate as many such
elements for exclusion, as to inflate Si,j only up to a cardinality of
m. For example, assume that Si,j includes elements R1, R2, R8,
while Sk,l contains R1, R2, R3, R4, R5. The delta information of
Si,j definitely includes R8. If m ≥ 6, there is no need to indicate
exclusions. A shortest path query from Ri to Rj will fetch from
5As boundary-case exception, if the look-up entry leads to either of
the last two pages in Fi, the client requests for its last three pages.
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Fd all 5 regions in Sk,l plusR8 (plus a number of dummies, if nec-
essary). On the other hand, if m = 5, the delta information must
exclude at least one of R3, R4, R5.
Note that our Fi compression mechanism is applied within indi-
vidual pages and not across them. That is, we do not use reference
sets Sk,l outside the page meant to hold Si,j because that would im-
ply additional page requests in Fi and increase the response time.
5.6 Packed Partitioning
As explained in Section 5.1, we choose a KD-tree to perform
network partitioning for a variety of reasons. However, the stan-
dard KD-tree would leave up to 50% unutilized space in Fd. Here
we propose a tree packing mechanism that guarantees high space
utilization (over 95% in our experiments). We need to allocate ex-
actly one page for each tree leaf (region), and inside store the in-
formation of all nodes that lie in its spatial extent (including their
coordinates, adjacency list, etc). The difficulty of the problem lies
in the variable length of node information, because adjacency lists
of different nodes have different sizes. Assuming that the largest
node information takes up z bytes, our strategy guarantees that all
pages in Fd (but the last) have no more than z unutilized bytes. To
achieve this, we construct an unbalanced KD-tree.
Suppose that each disk page has size B bytes, and assume that
the first split (at the root of the KD-tree) is meant to be vertical, like
in Figure 2. We sort the information of all nodes based on their x
coordinate and place them contiguously to form a byte-stream. The
split is made at the (2i · (B − z))-th byte of the stream, where i is
the smallest integer for which the split position is to the right of the
middle byte in the stream. All nodes to the left of the split position
(including the node that owns the information stored in the specific
position) are placed into the left child of the root.
Consider now the subtree at the root’s left child. The child is split
iteratively in a way similar to a plain KD-tee, i.e., splits happen at
the middle byte of the node information stream. The power of the
algorithm is that we can arbitrarily push the node that overlaps
with the split position either to the left or right of the split, without
fear of eventually overflowing any of the resulting leaves (pages).
This is the case, because when we had split the root we implicitly
allowed a leeway of z bytes per region (which is enough by defi-
nition to fit any node’s information). On the other hand, the splits
lead eventually to 2i leaves. Having squeezed at least 2i · (B − z)
bytes into 2i leaves, we are sure to utilize at least B − z bytes per
page.
The process applied to the root is now recursively repeated for
its right child. That is, we sort its contents on y coordinate. In the
resulting byte-stream, we perform a split at position 2j ·(B−z) for
the smallest integer j that puts the split to the right of the middle
byte. Splits in its own left child happen simply at the middle byte,
leading to 2j leaves that hold at least 2j · (B − z) bytes of data. In
its right child, a byte-stream is formed and split in a way similar to
the root, and so on.
6. PASSAGE INDEX SCHEME
As we show in the experiments, CI requires little extra space
compared to simply storing the raw network data. However, the
longest paths inGmay span a considerable number of regions (im-
plying that value m, in Section 5.4, may be large). That leads to
a significant number of PIR accesses in Fd which dominate the re-
sponse time. Motivated by this fact, we propose the Passage Index
(PI) scheme – with the use of more space, PI achieves a drastic re-
duction in the number of pages needed, and thus in response time.
In PI, instead of having the client retrieve all intermediate regions
between Rs and Rt, we materialize an exact subgraph that links
them. Specifically, pre-computation is the same as in CI. However,
instead of keeping Si,j , we record for every pair of Ri and Rj
the exact edges that appear in one or more shortest paths between
their border nodes. Essentially, these edges define a subgraphGi,j ,
such that every shortest path from Ri to Rj is guaranteed to pass
entirely through the union of Ri, Rj and Gi,j . In the example of
Figure 3, G1,8 includes, among others, the edges that belong to the
two shortest paths (shown in red and blue).
PI involves four files, formed as explained in Section 5.3, the
difference being that the network index file includes theGi,j infor-
mation (instead of Si,j). Placement into physical pages follows the
same principles. In query processing, however, there are only three
rounds. The first two are identical to CI, while the third fetches (i)
from Fi the subgraph Gs,t that corresponds to the source and des-
tination regions, and (ii) the two pages in Fd that hold the network
information of Rs and Rt. Regarding the query plan, let h be the
maximum number of pages spanned by any subgraph Gi,j in the
network index file. Each shortest path computation should retrieve
in the first round the entire header (directly from the LBS, without
involving the SCP), in the second round one page from Fl, while
in the third round exactly h pages from Fi and two pages from Fd.
Note that if h = 1, which may be the case for a small network, PI
answers the query with only four PIR accesses.
In PI the network index file vastly dominates the space require-
ments. To reduce its size, we observe that subgraphs Gi,j exhibit
locality (i.e., for nearby (i, j) pairs the subgraphs share many com-
mon edges) and apply a similar compression to Section 5.5. When
inserting Gi,j into an Fi page, we chose as reference the subgraph
in the same page with the largest number of common edges. The
delta information in this case does not need to indicate exclusions
(as they do not affect the query plan), but simply specifies the edges
in Gi,j that are missing from the reference subgraph.
As we show in Section 7, the compression strategy reduces space
drastically. However, the network index file may still be volumi-
nous. In our experiments, the database size in PI is two orders
of magnitude larger than CI, which renders it inapplicable to the
largest networks we used (it exceeds the maximum file size sup-
ported by the PIR interface). Besides PIR-imposed limitations, the
LBS may need to host multiple databases and therefore allocate
only a specific amount of space to support queries on G. Below
we propose two techniques that sacrifice in part the efficiency of PI
(i.e., response time) in order to reduce space requirements.
Hybrid Scheme (HY): PI performs a small number of page re-
trievals, but needs a lot of space. On the other hand, CI requires
little space, but if value m (i.e., the maximum number of regions
across all Si,j sets) is large, response time will suffer due to the PIR
access cost. HY is a hybrid between the two schemes that features
faster response time than CI and smaller space requirements than
PI. Importantly, the space-time trade-off may be tuned to suit the
application requirements.
Using the same pre-computation as CI, we form region sets Si,j
for all (i, j) pairs. Instead of placing them directly into Fi, we iter-
atively identify the region set with the largest number of elements
(i.e., the one that determines valuem, and therefore the number of
PIR accesses) and replace it with itsGi,j counterpart. This replace-
ment procedure increases gradually the size of Fi, and reduces the
number of PIR accesses, i.e., accelerates processing. Replacement
stops when a desirable trade-off between space and response time
is struck, or when Fi reaches the maximum permissible size. The
network index file stores for every (i, j) pair either a region set Si,j
or a subgraph Gi,j .
The header is similar to CI/PI. In Fl, all look-up entries have
the same format, regardless of whether they lead to a region set or
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subgraph in Fi, and are intermixed transparently in the file. A key
difference from previous schemes is that Fi and Fd are concate-
nated into a single file. The reason will become clear shortly.
Assume for simplicity that each of the Si,j sets (that were not
replaced by subgraphs during pre-processing) fits in one page of
Fi. Query processing is identical to CI/PI in the first two rounds
(accessing Fh and Fl). In the third round, after retrieving the look-
up entry for pair (s, t), we access Fi and fetch Ss,t or the first page
of Gs,t (whichever was stored in Fi during pre-processing). If it
is Ss,t, in the fourth round we access from Fd the pages that store
Rs, Rt and all regions in Si,j . If it isGs,t, the fourth round fetches
from Fi the subsequent pages of the subgraph information (recall
that the third round only fetched the first page of Gs,t), and from
Fd the network data of Rs, Rt.
Note that if Fi and Fd are separate files, the adversary can ob-
serve how many pages are accessed from each, and infer whether
the client’s query was answered via a region set or a subgraph. This
is a leakage we cannot afford; if the query was answered via a re-
gion set Si,j , the adversary (which is aware of the replacement pro-
cess and its parameters) can immediately narrow down the possible
source-destination regions to those who were not chosen for re-
placement during pre-computation, and vice versa. Hence, Fi and
Fd are concatenated into the same physical file. The query plan
requires accessing one page from this combined file in round three.
For round four, we compute the maximum number of pages needed
for any (i, j) pair and assert that every query fetches as many.
A final remark about HY regards the general case where not all
Si,j sets fit in a single page. Let r be the maximum number of
pages that an (un-replaced) region set spans in Fi. In this case, any
query in round three must access exactly r pages from the network
index file, be it for a region set or a subgraph. These r pages are
consecutive in Fi to guarantee that if the (s, t) pair corresponds to
a region set, Ss,t will be read in full. If it is a subgraph (i.e., Gs,t),
its remaining pages (past the r-th) will be read in round four.
Clustered PI (PI*): Another alternative to reduce the space re-
quirements of PI is to keep the scheme as is, but allocate more than
one page per region. We name this variant clustered PI and denote
it as PI*. Partitioning uses the packed KD-tree approach in Section
5.6, with the extended leaf/region capacity. The exact number of
pages per region is a system parameter that determines the trade-
off between space and time.
The above amendment effectively reduces the size of Fi because
it leads to (i) fewer regions, and (ii) fewer border nodes in total
(because there are fewer KD-tree splits). In turn, fewer regions
imply fewer subgraphs Gi,j in Fi. Also, fewer border nodes imply
materializing shortest path information (in the form of subgraphs)
for fewer border node pairs. The more pages allocated per region,
the smaller the network index file. Size aside, the construction and
usage of Fi is similar to the original PI.
Regarding Fd formation, the pages that correspond to a region
are placed contiguously on disk. As per normal, Fd is accessed
in the third round of processing to retrieve the network data of Rs
and Rt. However, all pages of these two regions must be fetched.
This is the only difference from the original PI processing, which
increases (to a controllable degree) the response time. For instance,
if 3 pages are allocated per region, the clustered PI retrieves 6 pages
of Fd per query (instead of just two in the original scheme).
7. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we evaluate empirically our schemes on real road
networks. We also quantify the effectiveness of individual opti-
mizations.
Table 1: Road networks
Road network Number of nodes Number of edges
Oldenburg (Old.) 6,105 7,029
Germany (Ger.) 28,867 30,429
Argentina (Arg.) 85,287 88,357
Denmark (Den.) 136,377 143,612
India (Ind.) 149,566 155,483
North America (Nor.) 175,813 179,179
Table 2: System specifications
System parameter Value
Disk page size 4 KByte
Disk seek time 11 ms
Disk read/write rate 125 MByte/s
SCP read/write rate 80 MByte/s
SCP encryption/decryption rate 10 MByte/s
Communication bandwidth 384 Kbit/s (48 Kbyte/s)
Communication round-trip time 700ms
7.1 Experiment Setup
The evaluation considers our advanced PIR-based methods (CI,
PI, HY, PI*) and the baseline competitors (LM, AF; described in
Section 4). CI and PI are parameterless, whereas HY and PI* in-
volve a parameter each to tune their index size. By default, the
methods incorporate all optimizations presented in the paper (e.g.,
the packed partitioning in Section 5.6, the index compression in
Section 5.5, etc). We also provide measurements for an obfusca-
tion method based on [22] (OBF); this is for the sake of a perfor-
mance indication only, because privacy-wise OBF leaks substantial
information about the client queries, as explained in Section 2.1.
We implemented all methods in C++ and conducted experiments
on a machine with an Intel Core2 Quad CPU 2.83 GHz and 4 GByte
of RAM. Table 1 describes the road networks used in our evalua-
tion: Oldenburg was obtained from Brinkhoff et al.6 and the rest
from the Digital Chart of the World7. Our machine uses a Seagate
320 GB (7,200 RPM) hard disk,8 with 11 ms disk seek time, 125
MBbyte/s disk read/write rate, and 4 KByte disk page size. Similar
to [36], we adopt the IBM 4764 PCI-X Cryptographic Coproces-
sor9 as the SCP and strictly simulate its performance. The SCP has
32 MByte memory and may support file sizes up to 2.5 GByte. Ta-
ble 2 summarizes the specifications of the SCP and the hard disk
(these values determine the time to retrieve a disk page via the PIR
interface, as detailed in [36]). The client communicates with the
LBS using a link with round trip time of 700ms and bandwidth
384 Kbit/s (i.e., 48 Kbyte/s) – this corresponds to a moving client
connected via a 3G network [30].
The average response time of a method is measured by running
a workload of 1,000 shortest path queries. It denotes the elapsed
time from query submission until obtaining the shortest path re-
sult. It consists of: (i) server processing time, (ii) communication
time, and (iii) client-side computation time. For the obfuscation
method (OBF), component (i) refers to the processing of obfus-
cated queries at the server. For the PIR-based methods, component
(i) corresponds to the PIR time for fetching disk pages from the
database.
6http://iapg.jade-hs.de/personen/brinkhoff/generator/
7http://www.maproom.psu.edu/dcw/
8http://www.seagate.com/www/en-us/products/desktops/
barracuda hard drives/
9http://www-03.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pcixcc/
overhardware.shtml
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7.2 Tuning of Baseline Schemes
The performance of baseline approaches is affected by their pa-
rameter values, namely, the number of anchor nodes in LM, and
the number of regions (i.e., the number of Arc-flag bits kept with
each edge) in AF. For fairness, we tune their parameters so that
they achieve the shortest possible response time. Since the optimal
values vary for different road networks, we fine-tune LM and AF
individually for each dataset.
In Figure 5 we describe LM tuning for the Argentina network.
The plots show its response time and space requirements with re-
spect to the number of anchor nodes (i.e., the length of the Land-
mark vector kept with each node). LM achieves the shortest re-
sponse time when 5 anchors are used. Figure 5(a) shows that too
few anchors lead to slow execution. The reason is that the Land-
mark vectors are not descriptive enough to effectively narrow down
the search space (i.e., to guide the A* search), which results in
fetching too many pages. On the other hand, the more anchors
used, the larger the Fd file (see Figure 5(b)). Given that PIR ac-
cesses become more expensive when the file size increases (as ex-
plained in Section 3.2), using too long Landmark vectors harms
responsiveness.
The fine-tuning (and the trends) of AF is similar. For Argentina
network, AF achieves the best response time when the number of
Arc-flag bits is 8. We omit the charts for brevity.
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Figure 5: LM fine-tuning (Argentina)
7.3 Comparison on Real Datasets
We first compare AF, LM, CI and PI on the Argentina network,
and present the results in Table 3. The response time is dominated
by the PIR cost, while the communication time and the client-side
computations account only for a small fraction of the total time.
With CI the client receives query results 3 times faster than AF and
LM. PI is even more efficient, outperforming the baseline schemes
by more than 5 times. To interpret performance, the table also
shows the number of PIR accesses in the region data and network
index files. AF and LM require reading more than half the database
for each query in order to abide by the query plan. Turning to our
methods, CI incurs 5 times more PIR accesses than PI; however,
they have a smaller difference in response time. This is because
PI performs retrievals on a much larger network index file than CI,
i.e., each access costs more. Table 3 also presents the space re-
quirements of the schemes. PI has the largest database, due to its
voluminous index.
Figure 6 illustrates the response time of an obfuscation method
(OBF) based on [22]. To reduce the amount of information leaked,
we form the obfuscation sets of s and t with decoys randomly and
uniformly chosen in the road network, instead of selecting loca-
tions near them (as in [22]). The figure shows the overall response
time versus the size of obfuscation sets S and T (where |S| = |T |)
on the Argentina network. For |S| and |T | in the order of tens,
OBF is less efficient than our schemes (CI and PI, represented by
horizontal lines) due to its large communication and server pro-
cessing costs. OBF provides weak privacy (there are |S| and |T |
Table 3: Components of response time (Argentina)
Method AF LM CI PI
Response time (s) 324.18 311.93 105.45 58.17
PIR time (s) 272.56 265.38 88.09 54.21
Communication time (s) 51.47 46.43 17.34 3.94
Client-side computations (s) 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.01
PIR page accesses of 595 of 536 of 193 of 2 of
the region data file 820 1,096 775 775
PIR page accesses of 0 0 2 of 36 of
the network index file 1,327 274,788
Total storage space (MB) 3.28 4.38 8.40 1,102
specific positions where s and t could lie). It is therefore not di-
rectly comparable to the strongly secure methods we study and is
not considered further.
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Figure 6: Effect of |S| on OBF, with |S| = |T | (Argentina)
Figure 7 compares AF, LM, CI, and PI on different road networks
(namely, Old., Ger., Arg.). The results fall in line with those in
Table 3 and establish the superiority of PI. However, its storage
space grows rapidly with the size of the road network. For larger
datasets (Den., Ind., Nor.), the network index file of PI exceeds the
2.5 GB limit, rendering the scheme inapplicable, and calling for its
tunable-size variants, HY and PI*. We postpone the investigation
of this larger-network case to Section 7.5.
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
Old. Ger. Arg.
R
es
p
o
n
se
 t
im
e 
(s
)
Dataset
AF
LM
CI
PI
(a) Response time (s)
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
Old. Ger. Arg.
S
to
ra
g
e 
sp
ac
e 
(M
B
)
Dataset
AF
LM
CI
PI
(b) Space requirements (MB)
Figure 7: Performance on different road networks
7.4 Effectiveness of Optimizations
In this section we examine the effectiveness of the two enhance-
ments introduced in Section 5, namely packed partitioning (Sec-
tion 5.6) and index compression (Section 5.5).
In Figure 8 we compare versions of CI and PI with packed versus
plain KD-tree partitioning; the plain KD-tree variants are denoted
as CI-P and PI-P. Figure 8(a) illustrates space utilization in the re-
gion data file Fd for different networks. Packing achieves over 95%
utilization in Fd in all cases. In contrast, the utilization for CI-P and
PI-P can be as low as 51% (for Ger.). The higher utilization in CI
and PI implies that Fd contains a smaller number of regions (equiv-
alently, takes up fewer pages), leading also to a smaller network
index file Fi. This explains the vast reduction in database size for
CI and PI in Figure 8(c) (note the logarithmic scale). Importantly,
the packed partitioning improves significantly the response time of
CI. This is because most accesses in CI are performed in the re-
gion data file, which is significantly smaller than CI-P. On the other
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hand, the response time of PI is relatively unaffected, because it
reads only two pages from Fd.
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Figure 8: Effect of packed partitioning on CI and PI
In Figure 9 we compare the full-fledged CI and PI against their
counterparts without index compression (denoted as CI-C, PI-C).
Figure 9(b) shows that the compression reduces storage space
significantly, especially for datasets with larger sizes. The PI-C
scheme (without compression) produces a network index file be-
yond 2.5 GByte on Argentina network. Its bar is marked as ‘Nil’,
indicating that it is inapplicable in this case – on the other hand, PI
(with compression) applies successfully. Figure 9(a) illustrates that
index compression improves the response time of PI but not that of
CI. The reason is explained by the number of PIR page accesses in
Table 3, namely, that most accesses in CI are made on the region
data file (whose size remains unchanged), whereas most accesses
in PI are made on the network index file (whose size is reduced).
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Figure 9: Effect of compression on CI and PI
7.5 Experiments on Larger Networks
In this section we consider larger road networks (Den., Ind.,
Nor.), where PI is inapplicable due to the size of its network in-
dex file. The place of PI is taken by Hybrid Scheme (HY) and
Clustered PI (PI*). Both HY and PI* enable tuning the network
index size. We investigate the space-time trade-off in each of them
before comparing with alternatives.
We first justify the design rationale of HY by examining the car-
dinalities |Si,j | of region sets in the network index of CI. In Figure
10(a) we run CI on Denmark and plot a histogram showing the
number of Si,j sets for different cardinalities. Since the largest re-
gion set has cardinality 229 (i.e., m = 229), the query plan of CI
requires fetching 229+2 disk pages from the region data file, lead-
ing to a long response time (see horizontal line in Figure 10(b)).
However, the majority of region sets have cardinalities below 100,
implying that there is plenty of space for improvement with HY.
In Figures 10(b) and 10(c) we use a cardinality threshold as the
tuning parameter for HY – any region set Si,j with cardinality
greater than the threshold is replaced by the corresponding Gi,j
subgraph. The threshold essentially controls the number of PIR re-
trievals in the query plan. The smaller this parameter, the shorter
the response time (and the larger the space required). In terms of
response time, the best threshold value is the smallest for which
the network index file does not exceed the maximum size sup-
ported. Although HY is meant to be a compromise between the
time-intensive CI and the space-intensive PI, for very large thresh-
old values it becomes slower than CI. The reason is that HY stores
both region data and network index into the same file (of increased
size), which means that each PIR access in HY is more expensive
than in CI.
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Figure 10: Performance of HY vs. limit on |Si,j | (Denmark)
The performance of PI* is determined by the number of cluster
pages, i.e., the number of disk pages allocated per region in the
region data file. Figure 11 shows the response time and space re-
quirements of PI* on Denmark network. As explained at the end of
Section 6, when the cluster size increases, the response time rises
(and the space consumption drops). PI* achieves its best perfor-
mance at the smallest cluster size (2) for which the network index
file is within the size limit of the PIR interface.
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Figure 11: Performance of PI* vs. cluster size (Denmark)
In the last experiment we compare CI, HY, and PI* on three large
networks. As AF and LM are particularly inefficient, we exclude
them from the charts. We tune both HY and PI* for the best running
time, while space requirements stay within the PIR-imposed bound.
The results in Figure 12 show that PI* achieves the fastest query
processing in all cases.
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Figure 12: Performance on larger networks
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we propose the first PIR-based framework for pri-
vate shortest path computation. Our objective is that the process-
ing server answers client queries without inferring any information
about them. We propose a suite of schemes that are readily deploy-
able (as they rely on off-the-shelf PIR building blocks) and empir-
ically evaluate them on large, real road networks. While perfor-
mance is reasonable for the degree of privacy achieved, the space
and time overheads imposed are significantly higher than unpro-
tected query processing. A challenging topic for future work is
to reduce these overheads. A possible direction is via (lossless or
lossy) compression of network data, taking into account their char-
acteristics/structure. Another is the development of approximate
schemes with bounded cost deviation from the actual shortest path.
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